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ABSTRACT 
Using primary data collected from 208 shrimp farming households and 69 households leasing-out land for 
shrimp farming, this paper explores the demographic and economic factors influencing the land leasing 
decisions for traditional and scientific shrimp farming in West Bengal, India, applying Tobit Model.  The 
results indicate that size of households‟ land holding is positively related with the extent of land leased-in 
for traditional shrimp farming whereas for scientific shrimp farming the association was found to be 
negative.  This  signifies  that  land  leasing  market  does  not  facilitate  the  households  having  lesser 
landholding to lease-in land for shrimp culture in the case of traditional shrimp farming whereas in the 
case of scientific shrimp farming it does facilitate such households. In the case of traditional shrimp 
farming households‟ association with other fisheries related activities was also found to have positive 
influence on their leasing-in decisions . On the supply side, variables like number of adult male members, 
households‟ association with fisheries related activities and non-farm assets were found to have positive, 
negative and positive association respectively with the extent of land leased-out for traditional shrimp 
farming. The analysis also exhibits that the age of the household head has negative relationship with the 
extent of land leased-out by them both in the case of traditional and scientific shrimp farming. This 
signifies that existing institutional arrangements in shrimp farming of West Bengal are not considerably 
successful to motivate young rural people to undertake shrimp farming on their own   instead of leasing-
out land for shrimp culture and aquaculture policies should address this aspect.   
Keywords: Shrimp Farming,Leasing-in,Leasing-out, leasing market 
INTRODUCTION  
Shrimp is one of the most important aquaculture products in India in terms of export earning capacity. 
Shrimp constitutes 44% of total marine product exports from India in terms of value and 21% in terms of 
volume.  The  economic  issues  pertaining  to  shrimp  aquaculture  have  attracted  the  attention  of  many 
researchers and the issues mainly revolves around the profitability of various shrimp farming systems, 
,the environmental costs of shrimp farming and the institutional aspects of shrimp farming. In the Indian 
context though many studies have dealt with the first two aspects, the institutional aspects are relatively 
less explored.  Studies dealing with the leasing institution of shrimp culture in India like  [1]and [2] 
mainly address two important issues, (1) land leasing policies and practices and (2) regulations of shrimp 
culture [3].  An overview of the state policies towards land leasing in shrimp culture unfolds that various 
state governments made conscious effort of fixing a certain ceiling of land to be leased for aquaculture to 
the poorer section of the society. So, the leasing policies in many states were directed by government 
expect Goa and West Bengal. Though leasing policies have largely been used as a means to promote 
shrimp farming and direct the available suitable land to the poorer section of the society, in many cases 
the emergence of shrimp farming as a commercial activity itself led to changes in the institutions of land 
leasing. Such changes include the increasing land rent in the area to changes in the land tenure systems 
[2,4]. But despite all the regulations and policy initiatives, the development of shrimp culture is still 
facing a number of challenges. Delay in the allotment of land by state governments, non-acceptance of 
leased-in land for mortgage and delay in sanction of loans act as a disincentive to the beneficiaries. Thus, 
despite the government‟s effort to re-distribute coastal lands suitable for shrimp culture in order to ensure 
access of such  lands to all the sections of society, private leasing markets for shrimp farming exists . So IIFET 2010 Montpellier Proceedings 
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far none of the studies have examined the nature and pattern of land leasing market for shrimp farming in 
Indian context. The studies mentioned above mainly describe the institutions involved in land leasing for 
shrimp culture and do not analyse the land leasing market of aquaculture in-depth. There has not been any 
systematic analysis on the leasing market of shrimp culture judged from both the demand and supply 
sides. The present paper intends to address this lacuna in the existing literature and attempts to analyze the 
determinants of leasing-in or leasing–out decisions in the context of shrimp farming. This would help to 
identify whether the private lease-market in shrimp culture functions efficiently by providing more land 
towards  the  households  with  lesser  land  for  shrimp  farming  or  not.  Such  an  investigation  will  also 
facilitate the policy makers to undertake policies which will facilitate the resource poor shrimp farmers to 
lease-in land and expand their farm size. The paper is divided into five sections. The following section 
provides  some  insights  from  the  literature  about  determinants  of  leasing  decision.  The  third  section 
outlines the model specification and the variables used in order to examine the determinants of land 
leasing-in and leasing-out for shrimp farming. The fourth section describes the data source used for the 
paper. Fifth section presents the estimation results and discussions of the results and the final section 
delineates the concluding remarks. 
ure  
FARM HOUSEHOLDS’ CHARECTERISTICS AND LEASING DECISIONS: INSIGHTS FROM 
THE LITERATURE  
 
The studies pertaining to the determinants of farm households‟ participation in the leasing market [5,6,7] 
are based on a few theoretical models which  have  two basic assumptions - there exists imperfect land, 
labour and credit market in the agricultural context and individuals differ in terms of their initial wealth,  
specific human capital and off-farm employment opportunities [8]. These studies broadly suggest that 
family labour, total land endowment of the farm households, factors which determine the managerial 
capacity of the family labourers and off-farm employment opportunities are the main factors affecting the 
participation of farm households in the leasing market. Following discussion depicts the interaction of 
these variables with the leasing decisions of the farm households.  
 
The labour input needed for cultivation can be either supplied by the members of the farm family or hired 
labour. Even for appointing hired labour, a farm family needs to have sufficient supervisory family labour 
to make those hired labourers work. There is an upper limit to which any given number of family workers 
can supervise the hired workers [9]. Once this limit is exceeded proper supervision becomes difficult and 
thus production suffers. Thus, the family which has sufficient number of workers is supposed to lease-in 
more  land.  On  the  other  hand,  the  farm  families  who  have  more  family  workers  face  problems  of 
gainfully employing the family labour on their land holding. In many cases, hiring out family labour as 
daily wage laboureres is not socially desirable [10]. Moreover, the management capability of a family 
labour can be employed gainfully if the farm family lease-in land instead of hiring out family labour as a 
daily wage labourers [11]. In case, market for family labour is imperfect, higher the number of male 
workers higher will be the amount of leased-in land.  
The total land endowment of the farm family is also an important factor in determining their leasing-in 
and leasing-out decisions. Leasing-in land itself is a result of an adjustment of the household towards its 
optimal operational scale [7]
a .Households lease-in or lease-out land to close the gap between the desired 
amount of land and actual amount of land owned by them. Thus, households owning lesser land are 
expected to lease-in land and households having more land ceteris paribus will lease-out land[12,6,13] 
The variables which affect the management capability of a particular farm family also affect their leasing 
decisions. The important decisions regarding the use of the land a household possesses, is taken by the 
head of the household. Thus, the socio-economic characteristics of the head of the household affect the 
leasing decisions. Age of the household head is supposed to have positive influence on the leasing-out 
decisions. This implies, the aged household heads would not be able to cultivate on their own and would 
like to lease-out their land. The education level of the household head is expected to have a positive 
influence  on  leasing-in  decisions.  Off-farm  labour  opportunities  are  expected  to  affect  leasing-in IIFET 2010 Montpellier Proceedings 
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decisions negatively. Higher off-farm labour opportunities will lead to leasing-out of land and households 
would go for other non-farm activities. The economic status of the farm households may also affect the 
leasing decision.  
 
DATA SOURCE 
 
In order to analyse the land leasing-in and leasing-out decision in the context of  shrimp farming the 
present paper uses primary data collected from the households in two shrimp farming districts of West 
Bengal, India. The existing leasing practices in West Bengal are dominated by private leasing markets, 
providing suitable ground for analyzing the factors determining leasing decisions of the households in the 
case of shrimp farming. Our analysis is based on the data on 108 traditional and 101 scientific shrimp 
farming  households  collected  by  multistage  stratified  random  sampling  technique  from  two  shrimp 
farming districts of West Bengal, India. In order to analyse the supply side of the leasing market, data  on 
40 and 29 sample households  who have leased-out land for shrimp farming have been collected from the 
study villages of traditional and scientific shrimp farming using random sampling . The study shrimp 
farming villages are engaged in small scale shrimp culture where the average shrimp farm size is less than 
two acres. The data has been collected during the culture year 2004-05. 
VARIABLES AND MODEL SPECIFICATION 
In order to analyze the factors influencing the leasing-in and leasing-out decisions for shrimp farming 
using  censored  regression  or  Tobit  model  has  been  used.  The  leasing-decision  involve  three  sets  of 
households, those who leased-in land for shrimp culture, those who leased-out land for shrimp culture and 
the  shrimp  farming  households  who did  not  participate in the  leasing  market  (owner operators).  An 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimate taking the extent of leased-in and lease-out land as a dependent 
and the possible factors affecting the leasing-decision as independent variables would not involve the 
observations pertaining to the sample shrimp farming households who did not participate in the leasing 
market (owner operators). Non inclusion of the owner operators in the analysis may generate biased 
estimates for the factors affecting leasing decisions in shrimp farming. Thus we have used the groups of 
lessees, lessors and owner-operators as our sample in the estimation of Tobit regression for the factors 
influencing households‟ decision to lease-in or lease-out land for shrimp culture. We have estimated 
separate models for the leasing-in and leasing-out decisions in the case of traditional and scientific shrimp 
farming. In the case of traditional shrimp farming our sample for Tobit model consists of 58 lessees, 50 
owner-operators and 40 lessors adding up to 148 households. In the case of scientific shrimp farming, our 
sample consists of 33 lessees, 67 owner-operators and 29 lessors adding up to 129 households. The Tobit 
model for leasing-in and leasing-out are left censored at zero. This implies that for the model on leasing-
in decision, the dependent variable assumes positive values if the household had leased-in land for shrimp 
culture and zero if the household is an owner-operator or had leased-out land for shrimp culture.  In the 
case of the Tobit model on leasing-out decision, the dependent variable assumes positive values if the 
household had leased-out land for shrimp culture and zero if the household is an owner-operator or had 
leased-in  land  for  shrimp  culture.  The  Tobit  model  to  identify  the  factors  affecting  leasing-in  (out) 
decision of the households for shrimp farming is specified as follows: 
e X b Y   ' *  
0 * , 0   ifY Y  
0 * *,   ifY Y Y
 
Where Y is a vector of the extent of land leased-in (out) for shrimp culture which is censored at zero; X is 
a matrix of explanatory variables which are hypothesised to influence the amount of land leased-in (out) 
for  shrimp  culture  by  the  households;  b  represents  vector  of  unknown  parameters  to  be  estimated 
corresponding  to  the  explanatory  variables  and  e  is  the  disturbance  term  assumed  to  be  normally 
distributed.  IIFET 2010 Montpellier Proceedings 
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The  explanatory  variables  in  this  case  reflect  the  heterogeneities  among  the  households  in  terms  of 
demographic composition of the family and other socio-economic variables. The explanatory variables 
include number of adult male members in the family (ADMALE); number of children in the family 
(CHILD); total land owned by the household (TOLAND) in acres; age of the household head (AGEHH) 
in years; whether the household is associated with fisheries related occupation or not (OFISH)[ OFISH 
takes the value one if household is associated with fisheries related occupation and zero otherwise] ; gram 
panchayat the household belongs to (GP) and value of non-farm assets possessed by the households  
(NASSET) („00000 Rs.). It should be mentioned that in the case of traditional shrimp farming GP=1, if 
the  household  belongs  to  Bermajur-I    gram  panchayat  and  GP=0,  if  the  household  belongs  to 
Sandeshkhali  gram panchayat. In the case of scientific shrimp farming GP=1, if the household belongs to 
Heria gram panchayat and GP=0, if the household belongs to Tikasi gram panchayat. 
 
 
In  the  Tobit  regression  the  number  of  adult  male  members  and  number  of  children  are included  as 
separate variables in order to capture the influence of different types of family labour in the leasing-in 
(out) decision of the households for shrimp culture. As discussed earlier if the market for family labour is 
imperfect, ADMALE is expected to have a positive impact on the leasing-in decisions of the household. 
This implies that households with higher number of adult male members are expected to gainfully employ 
their  family  labour  into  shrimp  culture  instead  of  hiring-out  their  labour  for  other  occupations.  The 
variable CHILD is expected to have a positive influence on the leasing-in decisions of the households. As 
the number of children (dependents) is more, households may lease-in more land for supporting their 
family by expanding their shrimp farming activity. On the other hand, the households having higher 
number of children are expected to offer lesser land in the lease market for shrimp culture.  
 
As discussed earlier, variable TOLAND is expected to have negative impact on the leasing-in decisions 
and  a  positive  influence  on  the  leasing-out  decisions  for  shrimp  culture.  If  the  households  who  are 
interested to undertake shrimp farming possess less land, they are supposed to lease-in more land in order 
to expand their shrimp farming activities. Such negative influence of total landholdings on leasing-in 
decisions  would  imply  that  the  land  lease  market  in  shrimp  farming  is  operating  efficiently  and 
facilitating the distribution of land towards households interested to culture shrimp with lesser land in 
their possession. The age of the household head AGEHH is expected to have negative influence on the 
leasing-in decisions because the younger farmers might be enthusiastic to expand the shrimp farming 
activity  by  leasing-in  land.  The  variable  representing  households‟  association  with  fisheries  related 
business (OFISH) is expected to have a positive impact on the leasing-in decision for shrimp farming. 
The  association  of  the  households  with  fisheries  related  occupations  might  expose  them  to  better 
information and hence inspire them to lease-in land for shrimp culture. The impact of the non-farm asset 
(NASSET) of the households would depend on many exogenous factors prevalent in the study area.  The 
asset of the lessees may act as an added incentive for the lessors to lease-out their land to wealthy people 
so that timely payment of the rent would be assured. Thus, the wealthy households are more likely to 
access the lands offered in the leasing market for shrimp culture if they wish. Moreover, the wealthy 
households generally have higher political influence in the rural settings. So, the process of leasing-out 
land for shrimp culture also might be easier for them. In that sense NASSET might have a positive 
influence on the supply side of the leasing market also. The leasing decisions of the households for 
shrimp farming may also be influenced by the gram panchayat they belong to. The institutional and 
locational factors specific to the gram panchayats may affect the leasing decisions of the households.  For 
example, in the study area for traditional shrimp farming the Sandeshkhali gram panchayat had undergone 
several changes as far as the development of shrimp farming is concerned. Though the household level 
shrimp farming is a recent phenomenon in the gram panchayat, earlier a few large shrimp farms existed in 
the area, owned by outsider entrepreneurs. The households who had small pieces of land in the river side 
used to lease-out their land to those entrepreneurs. So, the practice of leasing already existed in the area IIFET 2010 Montpellier Proceedings 
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before. Thus, in Sandeshkhali, the practice of leasing-in and leasing-out land for shrimp culture might be 
more prominent. Moreover, location specific factors like existence of more land worth leasing-in (out) for 
shrimp culture in a particular gram panchayat may also influence the leasing decisions of the households. 
In order to capture such influences on leasing decisions for shrimp farming we have incorporated the 
variable GP.  
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
Before going into the details of the estimation results let us have a glance on the descriptive statistics of 
the variables which are presented in table I. Our sample of 108 traditional shrimp farming households 
consists of 50 households who have used their own land and hence are the owner operators in shrimp 
culture. The average landholding of the households leasing-in land for shrimp farming is slightly lower 
than  that  of  the  owner  operators  in  the  case  of  traditional  shrimp  farming.  However  the  average 
landholding of the lessors was more than that of the owner operators in the case of traditional shrimp 
farming.  The average number of male members in the family was higher for lessors in the case of both 
traditional  and  scientific  shrimp  farming.  The  table  also  reveals  that  the  percentage  of  households 
associated with fisheries related activities were more for lessees than that of the owneroperators in case of 
both the shrimp farming systems. In the case of both traditional and scientific shrimp farming  the average 
household head for owner operators were higher than that of the lessors .  It can also be observed from the 
table that households who leased-in higher amount of land possessed higher value of non-farm assets. The 
average value of non-farm asset possessed by owner-operators was Rs. 31826 which was lesser than the 
value of non-farm assets owned by the lessees irrespective of the groups. The above observations indicate 
that the amount of  assets have a favourable impact on leasing-in land for shrimp culture.  
 
Table I: Descriptive Statistics of the Variables 
  
          Note: Figures in the parentheses indicate the t-values 
           Source: Primary survey 
 
  Traditional Shrimp Farming  Scientific Shrimp Farming 
Variables   Owner 
operators 
Leesses  Lessors  Owner 
operators 
Leesses  Lessors 
Sample   50  58  40  67  32  29 
Leased-in  (out) 
land(acres) 
-  6.24 
(15.96) 
1.2 
(0.91) 
-  0.99 
(0.69) 
1.50 
(0.66) 
Total land owned 
(acres) 
1.86 
(2.04) 
1.81 
(2.37) 
2.15 
(0.58) 
2.03 
(1.44) 
1.93 
(1.34) 
4.8 
(2.2) 
No  of  male 
members 
2.57 
 (1.19)                                                                                                                                              
2.8 
(1.73) 
3.0 
(0.82) 
2.39 
(1.2) 
2.04 
(1.00) 
2.9 
(1.1) 
No. of Children  1.88 
(1.58) 
1.69 
(1.27) 
1.38 
(1.40) 
2.17 
(1.99) 
1.76 
(1.28) 
1.48 
(0.98) 
Association  with 
fisheries related  
Business (%) 
28.6  56.9  26.2  19.40  27.27  31.03 
Age  of  the 
household Head 
49.24 
(11.02) 
 
41.52 
(12.4) 
48.6 
(16.4) 
51.75 
(19.6) 
52.72 
15.9) 
 
51.0 
(18.6) 
Value of non-farm 
assets(Rs.) 
 
31826 
(12096) 
 
41970 
(25946) 
42445 
(28229) 
104968 
(46513) 
112340 
(63121) 
12356 
(10365) IIFET 2010 Montpellier Proceedings 
  6 
 
The  estimation  results  of  the  Tobit  models  for  leasing-in  and  leasing-out  decisions  in  the  case  of 
traditional  shrimp  farming  are  presented  in  Table  II.  The  maximum  likelihood  estimates  of  the 
coefficients are presented in the Table. It can be observed from Table II that the variable TOLAND has a 
statistically significant influence on the amount of land leased-in for shrimp culture. The positive sign of 
the  coefficient  implies  that  holding  everything  else  constant  the  households  with  higher  amount  of 
landholdings will lease-in more land for shrimp culture. The shrimp farmers who had higher land in 
possession  might  have  received  preference from  the  lessors  because  possession  of  higher land is an 
assurance for them for timely payment of the lease-rent. On the other hand, the households who had 
higher land holdings could afford to keep a portion of their own land for agricultural purposes. So, 
possession of agricultural land might have acted as a risk covering measure for the households, and 
inspire them to undertake shrimp culture on leased-in land. Thus leasing market in the case of traditional 
shrimp farming does not facilitate the small landowners to lease-in land and undertake shrimp farming.  
The estimation results also show that OFISH has a positive and statistically significant influence on the 
households‟ leasing-in decisions for shrimp culture. This implies that households associated with fisheries 
related  activities  will  lease-in  more  land  for  shrimp  farming.  This  could  be  due  to  the  fact that  the 
households related to fisheries related occupations have higher access to information related to leasing 
market for shrimp culture in the locality.  
 
 
Table II: Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Tobit Model for Factors Influencing Leasing-in and 
Leasing-out Decision for Traditional Shrimp Farming 
  Leasing-in  Leasing-out 
Variables  Coefficients   P-values  Coefficients   P-values 
Constant  -20.06 
(-2.54) 
0.01  0.99 
(0.87) 
0.38 
ADMALE(number)  -0.29 
(-0.25) 
0.80  0.41 
(2.25) 
0.02 
CHILD(number)  0.29 
(0.25) 
0.76  -0.34 
(-2.24) 
0.02 
TOLAND(acres)  3.12 
(4.30) 
0.00  0.06 
(0.57) 
0.56 
OFISH (Dummy)  9.76 
(3.54) 
0.00  -0.71 
(-1.71) 
0.08 
AGEHH(years)  0.15 
(1.19) 
0.23  -0.05 
(-2.68) 
0.00 
GP(Dummy)  -8.74 
(-3.07) 
0.00  -0.67 
(-1.71) 
0.08 
NASSET („00000 Rs.)  0.06 
(1.31) 
0.18  0.02 
(2.69) 
0.00 
Sigma   12.88 
(10.24) 
0.00  1.67 
(7.95) 
0.00 
LR chi2(7)  50.74   31.79 
Prob>chi2  0.000  0.000 
Log-likelihood  -271.49  -119.09 
Number of observations  148  148 
           
           Note: Figures in the parentheses indicate the t-values 
           Source: Primary survey 
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Interestingly, the locational and institutional factors captured by the variable GP are also found to have 
significant influence on the leasing-in decisions of the traditional shrimp farming households. In this case 
the negative coefficient of the variable GP signifies that the households belonging to Bermajur-I gram 
panchayat leased-in lesser land than that of the households in the Sandeshkhali gram panchayat. As 
mentioned earlier, this could be a result of the prior existence of leasing practices and existence of more 
land suitable for shrimp culture in the riverside areas of the Sandeshkhali gram panchayat. Table II also 
presents  the  estimation  results  for  factors  influencing  the  households‟  decision  to  lease-out  land  for 
traditional shrimp culture. It can be observed from the table that the variables related to the demographic 
characteristics of the household namely number of adult male members in the family, number of children 
and  age  of  the  household  head  played  significant  role  on  the  supply  side  of  the  leasing  market  for 
traditional shrimp farming. The positive and statistically significant coefficient of the variable ADMALE 
indicates  that the  households  having  more  number  of  adult  male  members  leased-out  more  land  for 
shrimp farming. This result is in contrast to the expectation that the households having more adult male 
members offer less land to the leasing market and self-cultivate their land. One of the reasons for this 
could be the risky nature of shrimp farming. The households with higher number of male members rather 
prefer to diversify their economic activities by engaging themselves into agriculture and other businesses 
instead of shrimp farming and lease-out their land suitable for shrimp culture. But, the results show that 
the households who had higher number of children in their  family offered lesser land in the leasing 
market for shrimp culture. One of the reasons for this could be that the households with higher number of 
children preferred to retain their land for future use rather than leasing-out for shrimp culture.  The 
negative coefficient of the variable AGEHH signifies that in the case of traditional shrimp farming the 
younger the household heads were, the more the land they leased-out for shrimp farming. This signifies 
that the young rural people did not have enough motivation to culture shrimp on their own, rather they 
leased-out  their  land  for  shrimp  culture. They  preferred to  enjoy  a  certain  annual  fixed income  and 
engaged themselves in other occupations. The positive coefficient of the NASSET implies that ceteris 
paribus households possessing higher non-farm assets leased-out more land for shrimp farming. This 
implies that comparatively wealthy households leased-out higher extent of land for traditional shrimp 
farming instead of culturing shrimp themselves. It can be observed that the total land owned (TOLAND) 
did not have significant impact on leasing-out decisions of the households in the case of traditional 
shrimp farming.  
The estimated coefficient of the variable OFISH is negative and statistically significant. This implies that 
among the households who leased-out land for shrimp farming, those who were associated with fisheries 
related  business  leased-out  lesser  land.  The  households  association  with  fisheries  related  activities 
exposes them to more information about the shrimp farming practices which might have inspired them to 
offer less land in the lease market for shrimp culture and culture shrimp on their own. As in the case of 
demand side of the leasing market for shrimp farming, in the supply side also variable GP was found to 
be statistically significant and negatively influencing households‟ decision to lease-out land. In this case 
the households belonging to Sandeshkhali gram panchayat leased-out higher extent of land than those 
belonging to Bermajur-I  gram panchayat. This implies the participation of the households in leasing 
activities for shrimp culture; both from the supply and demand side was more prominent in Sandeshkhali 
Gram panchayat.  The significant value of sigma which is the inverse Mill‟s ratio reveals that exclusion of 
the observations with zero value of the variable Y would bias the results  in case of both sides of the 
leasing market for shrimp farming.  
In the case of scientific shrimp farming also, we have tried to explore the factors influencing households‟ 
decision to lease-out and lease-in land for shrimp farming following the Tobit models specified earlier. 
The results of the estimated coefficients for the leasing-out and leasing-in decision for scientific shrimp 
farming are presented in Table III. But in the case of scientific shrimp farming our estimation results do 
not  indicate  significant  influences  of  the  household  specific  demographic  and  socio-economic 
characteristics on their leasing-in and leasing-out decisions. A possible reason for such results could be 
that in the study area for scientific shrimp farming the leasing practice for shrimp farming itself was very IIFET 2010 Montpellier Proceedings 
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limited.  In  our  sample  scientific  shrimp  farmers  only  33%  had  leased-in  land  for  shrimp  culture. 
Moreover, in our four study villages only 29 households were found to lease-out land for shrimp culture.  
The limited practice of leasing land for shrimp farming in the study area itself might have restricted the 
scope to identify the specific household characteristics which may significantly influence their leasing 
decisions. However, in order to get some idea about the household specific characteristics influencing 
their decision to lease-in and lease-out land for shrimp culture, let us look into the results presented in 
Table III. It can be noted that in the case of leasing-in land for scientific shrimp farming, the only variable 
found to have statistically significant influence on leasing-in decisions for shrimp culture is TOLAND. 
The sign of the estimated coefficient reveals that in case of scientific shrimp farming ceteris paribus the 
households having lesser land endowment leased-in more land for shrimp culture. This is the opposite 
case of traditional shrimp farming where the impact of the total landholding of the household on leasing-
in decision was positive. One of the possible reasons for this difference could be the very high returns of 
scientific shrimp farming. The households having lesser land also undertake the risk of leasing-in because 
two or three years of successful crops can turn their fortune. Another reason could be, the households 
possessing lesser lands did not want to culture shrimp on their own land because if they convert their 
entire  land  into  shrimp  ponds  and  incur  loss  in  shrimp  culture,  the  land  would  not  be  suitable  for 
agriculture at least in the near future.  Our result indicates that in the case of scientific shrimp farming the 
existing leasing arrangements facilitate the households who had lesser landholdings to lease-in land for 
culturing shrimp.  
Table III: Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Tobit Model for Factors Influencing Leasing-in and 
Leasing-out Decision for Scientific Shrimp Farming 
 
  Leasing-in  Leasing-out 
Variables  Coefficients   P-
values 
Coefficients   P-
values 
Constant  -1.27 
(-1.30) 
0.19  -1.27 
(-1.17) 
0.24 
ADMALE(number)  -0.24 
(-1.36) 
0.17  0.22 
(1.39) 
0.16 
CHILD(number)  -0.09 
(-0.71) 
0.47  -0.09 
(-0.67) 
 
0.49 
TOLAND(acres)  -0.21 
(-2.45) 
0.01  0.48 
(4.89) 
0.00 
OFISH (Dummy)  0.11 
(0.27) 
0.66  0.55 
(1.35) 
0.18 
AGEHH(years)  0.02 
(1.13) 
0.25  -0.04 
(-2.21) 
0.00 
GP(Dummy)  -0.05 
(-0.12) 
0.90  0.17 
(0.43) 
0.18 
NASSET(„00000 Rs.)  0.005 
(1.46) 
0.15  .018 
(0.42) 
0.66 
Sigma   1.54 
(6.42) 
0.00  1.41 
(6.56) 
0.00 
LR chi2(7)  20.00  51.81 
Prob>chi2  0.01  0.000 
Log-likelihood  -100.76  -80.38 
Number of observations  129  129 
 
              Note: Figures in the parentheses indicate the t-values;   Source: Primary survey IIFET 2010 Montpellier Proceedings 
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It can also be observed from table 3 that the variable TOLAND has positive and significant influence on 
the households‟ decision to lease-out land for shrimp culture. Thus, ceteris paribus the household who 
owned higher amount of total land leased-out more land for shrimp culture. This is consistent with the 
expected sign that households with higher landholding lease-out more land.  Thus it can be said that the 
land  market  in  the  case  of  scientific  shrimp  farmers  facilitates  the  transfer  of  land  from  the  big 
landowners to small landowners. In case of scientific shrimp farming also it can be observed that, lesser 
the age of the head of the household, higher was the land leased-out for shrimp culture. This implies that 
the younger farmers leased-out their land and engaged their family labour in business related activities, 
instead of taking the risk of shrimp farming.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This paper examines the nature of leasing market in shrimp farming from the demand and supply side. 
The  analysis  of  factor  influencing  the  leasing-in  and  leasing-out  decisions  of  the  shrimp  farming 
households reveals that in the case of traditional shrimp farming the households with higher amount of 
landholdings leased-in more land for shrimp culture. This suggests that private lease-market in shrimp 
farming does not facilitate the households with less landholdings to lease-in land, in the case of traditional 
shrimp farming. Thus, the government should encourage the redistribution of coastal lands for shrimp 
culture, especially, to the households having less landholding. Households‟ association with fisheries 
related occupations was found to have favourable impact on their leasing-in decisions in the case of 
traditional shrimp farming. In the supply side it was found that the households with higher number of 
male members, preferred to lease-out more land rather than employing their male workforce into shrimp 
culture. It was observed that in the case of traditional shrimp farming system the young household heads 
leased-out more land for shrimp culture. In the case of scientific shrimp farming, it was found that the 
households with lesser landholdings leased-in more land for shrimp farming. This indicates that in the 
case  of  scientific  shrimp  farming  the  existing  lease  market  facilitates  the  households  with  lesser 
landholdings to lease-in land for scientific shrimp farming. As in the case of traditional shrimp farming, in 
the case of scientific shrimp farming also younger household heads lease-out higher amount of land for 
shrimp culture. Thus, it can be said that the present prospects and institutional arrangements in shrimp 
farming are not considerably successful to catch the imagination of the young rural people and motivate 
them to undertake shrimp farming instead of leasing-out their land for shrimp farming. 
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